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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper explores the relationship between bank competition and financial sector stability using 
2005–2010 data for ten African countries. The study utilises a Generalized Method of Moments 
approach to regress bank stability indices – Z-score, non-performing loans ratio and return on 
banks assets – on bank competition indices – Lerner-Index, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index total 
assets and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index total deposits. The findings show a robust positive 
relationship between market power and financial stability. This unequivocally suggests that there 
is a trade-off between bank competition and financial sector stability in these countries, as per the 
competition-fragility view. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he debate on whether competition among banks is good or bad has always been a contentious one, 
see for example Vives (2001), Beck (2008), Carletti and Vives (2009), and Beck et al. (2012). The 
2007–2009 global financial crisis, however, intensified the debate, with special attention being paid 
to bank regulation. According to Beck (2008), the right balance between competition and regulation is required. 
Competition mixed with the wrong kind of regulation can be a dangerous concoction. This debate is especially 
important given the mergers and acquisitions, as well as the financial-sector liberalisation witnessed in a number of 
developing countries, including African countries (Vives, 2001). 
 
 There are a number of reasons why competition among banks may be welfare enhancing. Competition 
forces banks to be more efficient and innovative regarding the development of new products and providing better 
banking services. The quest for profits in a highly competitive environment can force banks to devise techniques 
that facilitate efficient borrower screening and monitoring. Competition also tends to put downward pressure on 
lending rates while increasing deposit rates, benefiting both borrowers/entrepreneurs and depositors (Beck, 2011). 
The lower interest rates faced by borrowers also reduce information asymmetry problems like moral hazard, 
ultimately reducing bank fragility. 
 
 Competition can also force banks to look for other clients outside the normal working class (Keeley, 1990; 
Beck, 2011). These may include the previously unbanked groups in society, thereby increasing access to finance 
(Beck, 2011)
1
. For example, mobile banking has resulted in an increase in finance in a number of African countries. 
For instance, in Kenya a payment service called M-Pesa was introduced. The facility allows the cellular handset to 
perform a number of financial services, including making payments and doing internet banking (Nkurunziza, et al., 
2012). In South Africa, a number of banks introduced the Mzansi account, which is primarily targeted at low-
income groups. Ultimately, all this tends to broaden the customer base of the financial system resulting in better risk 
                                                          
1 Especially in Africa where the proportion of people without banking services is still very high (Beck, et al., 2001) 
T 
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diversification (Beck, 2011). This is supported by Berger et al. (2004) who found that lack of competition in the 
banking sector can also contribute to reduced access to finance for smaller firms and a country’s very poor.  
 
 However, excessive competition in the banking sector can be harmful to the economy as it can undermine 
bank franchise value, incentivising banks to take excessive risks. This may lead to herding trends, with financial 
institutions taking similar risks and ultimately increasing systemic fragility and contagion risk (Beck, 2011). Also, 
banking systems characterised by a few large banks may be good for the economy as large banks can easily 
diversify across sectors and regions, reducing instability.  
 
 Given the advantages and disadvantages of competition in the financial sector, it is not surprising that there 
is no general consensus on whether competition among banks leads to financial-sector stability (Vives, 2001). 
Following Berger et al. (2009) and using a sample of banks from ten African countries and covering the period 
2005–2010, this study aims to investigate the relationship between bank competition and financial stability. It seeks 
to investigate whether competition fosters or undermines financial-sector stability.  
 
 From a policy perspective, the banking sector plays a pivotal role in any given economy. An understanding 
of the relationship between bank competition and financial-sector stability is therefore important for policy as it 
helps ensure the right mix between competition and regulation. Recent literature has been driven by the motivation 
of policy concerns as to what type of market structure leads to the most efficient and stable operating environment 
for banking firms (Lui et al., 2010). After the financial collapse in 2008, there has been renewed interest in the 
relationship between competition, stability and regulation. Hoggarth and Saporta (2001) showed that the fiscal cost 
of a financial crisis can be as high as 17% of GDP for a developing economy. The banking sector forms the financial 
backbone of every economy, hence an understanding of the core dynamics that affect stability is of vital importance. 
Also, there is no consensus in the extant literature on the optimal level of financial-sector regulation (Vives, 2001). 
Berger et al. (2004) argue that despite recent studies on banking in developing countries, further research on banking 
stability in developing nations is still needed.  
 
 African countries are interesting to study for a number of reasons. Firstly, they are less developed and their 
financial systems are still at an embryonic stage of development. They can therefore learn a lot from developed 
economies, including from mistakes made by developed economies. For example, one lesson learnt from the current 
global financial crisis is that African countries must be careful not to import everything that appears to work in 
developed economies. Another lesson is that as they develop, African countries must come up with systems that do 
not create perverse incentives among the different players in the financial sector. For example, the role of players, 
like the credit-rating agencies, investment banks, and the regulators, must be well defined.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 At the centre of the debate on the relationship between bank competition and stability are two main 
hypotheses - the competition-stability view (also known as concentration-fragility view, charter or franchise-value 
view) and the competition-fragility view (also known as concentration-stability view). 
 
 The competition-fragility view, as modelled by Keeley (1990) and Marcus (1984), postulates that 
competition undermines stability and market power is stability enhancing. That is, there is a trade-off between 
competition and stability. According to this view, competition, by lowering profits, lowers a bank’s franchise value, 
which increases moral hazard as banks take on excessive risk to accommodate the lower margins received in the 
competitive loan market (Hellman et al., 2000)
2
. On the contrary, in less competitive environments, banks earn 
monopoly rents resulting in higher bank profits and higher franchise values. The high franchise values discourage 
banks from taking excessive risks as they try to protect their increased franchise values (Lui et al.,  2010). Less 
competitive environments also imply that the incumbent banks have higher probabilities of getting more lucrative 
business opportunities and higher capital cushions
3
 - something that may enable them to withstand shocks. This 
                                                          
2 In Boot, Greenbaum and Thakor (1993) it is, however, argued that bank reputation and the private cost of failure of managers 
reduces the incentive for banks to take on more risk when competition increases. 
3 With some of the profits being retained and not issued as dividends, hence increasing the firm’s capital base. 
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implies that they do not have excessive pressure to take excessive risk. This view is also supported by Boot et al. 
(1993) who argue that greater market power allows banks to protect their franchise value by generating larger capital 
buffers, which make bank managers act more prudently and pursue lower-risk strategies.  
 
 There are a number of studies that find supporting evidence for the competition-fragility view. These 
include Keeley (1990), Allen and Gale (2000; 2004), Besanko and Thakor (2004), Edwards and Mishkin (1995). 
Using data on US banks, Keeley (1990) investigated the effect of market structure on bank risk and found that banks 
try to protect the franchise value emanating from their market power by keeping their lending risk relatively low. 
Saunders and Wilson (1996) also used US banks for a longer sample period and found evidence corroborating 
Keeley (1990)’s findings. Hellman et al. (2000) argue that the increased competition in the Japanese financial sector, 
chiefly caused by the country’s financial liberalisation in the 1990s, reduced financial stability and may have 
contributed to the East Asian financial crisis (Jimenez et al., 2010). Allen and Gale (2000; 2004) found results 
suggesting that a concentrated banking system is likely to be more stable due to banks being more profitable, more 
diverse and easier to monitor. Besanko and Thakor’s (2004) study supported the view that increased competition 
induces banks to choose riskier portfolio strategies. Edwards and Mishkin (1995) also argued that competition tends 
to reduce a bank’s cost advantage in the acquisition of funds and undermines its position in the loan market. In their 
comprehensive literature review on the competition-stability nexus, Carlett and Vives (2008) conclude that market 
power has a moderating effect on the risk-taking behaviour of banks. Using a sample of 821 banks from 60 
developing countries, Turk-Ariss (2010) found a positive relationship between market power and financial stability, 
suggesting that increased market power may improve bank soundness and possibly economic stability (Turk-Ariss, 
2010).  
 
 The competition-stability view posits that there is no trade-off between competition and stability. In fact, 
competition fosters stability and higher market power is associated with financial instability. This view, as 
theoretically developed in Boyd and Runkle (1993) and Mishkin (1999), is predicated on two main arguments – the 
too-big-to-fail problem and the too-big-to-monitor problem. The former argument emanates from the fact that banks 
operating in highly concentrated markets can become so large, so pivotal for the economy, and so interconnected 
that their failure tends to impose huge social costs on the society and can be catastrophic for the entire economy, and 
therefore must be supported by the government when facing bankruptcy. This high probability of bailout for the 
large banks may create problems of moral hazard as there is a high incentive for banks to take excessive risks 
knowing that in the event of failure, the government will bail them out. This may result in financial-sector fragility. 
The latter argument states that the size of a bank is positively related to its complexity, thus small banks are easier to 
monitor and regulate than large banks. Hence, large banks are also associated with the so-called too-complex-to-
monitor problem. This may encourage them to take excessive risks, knowing that regulators may not notice the 
excessive risks to which the banks may be exposed. Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) take a different tack trying to 
demonstrate the positive relationship between competition and stability. They argue and demonstrate that lower 
lending rates that are associated with a more competitive banking sector are good for entrepreneurs (or borrowers) as 
they lower the cost of borrowing and increase the probability of success of the entrepreneurs’ projects. The success 
of borrowers’ projects also reduces their probability of default, which reduces credit risks and ultimately bank 
fragility (Beck et al., 2012).  
 
 The concentration-fragility view is largely driven by the neoclassical paradigm, which states that an 
increase in firm competition in a given economic sector will lower monopoly rents and create a more efficient 
sector. The view that competition should be good in the banking sector, just as it is good in the other economic 
sectors, may not necessarily be true. As argued above, by lowering franchise value, competition among banks may 
actually worsen moral hazard problems as banks are forced to take on excessive risk to accommodate the lower 
margins received in the loan market (Hellman et al., 2000). However market power, by moderating and dampening 
risk-taking incentives of bank managers, can actually be associated with financial stability (Vives, 2001; Keeley, 
1990; and Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz, 2000). 
 
 Studies that find supporting evidence for the concentration-fragility view include Boyd et al. (2006), De 
Nicolo and Loukoianova (2007, and Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009). Using separate banking data sets; one on US 
banks and the other on banks from more than 100 countries, Boyd et al. (2006) investigated the relationship between 
financial stability and market structure and found a negative relationship between the Z-score (a measure of 
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financial stability) and the HHI (a measure of market power), suggesting that an increase in market power tended to 
reduce financial sector stability. This is further supported by Uhde and Heimishoff (2009) who used data on a 
sample of 2600 EU banks covering the period 1997–2005. Similar results were also found by De Nicolo et al. 
(2004). De Nicolo et al. (2004) used a sample of 500 of the largest financial institutions, covering the period 1993–
2000, to investigate the impact of bank consolidation on financial stability and found that more concentrated 
banking systems tended to have higher levels of systemic risk than less concentrated systems. De Nicolo and 
Loakoianova (2007), using bank data from 133 non-industrialised countries covering the period 1993–2004, 
investigated the relationship between bank failure and market structure inter alia.They found a positive relationship 
between concentration and bank failure, with the robustness of the result improving with an increased involvement 
of government-owned banks (which were found to have higher risk profiles than private-owned banks). The 
competition and stability test for this study closely follows Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2009) and aims to 
regress competition measures on stability measures.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
 The paper uses data on banks from ten African countries. It covers the period 2005–2010 and includes 
South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan, Ghana and Kenya. The focus of the 
methodology is to evaluate the extent to which competition affects bank stability. Following Berger et al. (2009), the 
study uses a series of market structure and stability variables to estimate the relationship between competition and 
stability. The relationship that we seek to test can be mathematically represented as follows: 
 
Financial Stability = f(Market structure, Banks controls, Business Environment) (1) 
 
 The study follows three steps to determine the relationship between market structure and stability. The first 
step involves measuring stability. The second step is to quantify competition. The last step is to run regressions of 
financial stability on market power measures and a number of control variables. This is done using the Generalised 
Methods of Moments (GMM) approach. The study follows the intermediation approach, which assumes that a bank 
uses inputs, such as labour and capital to receive deposits, to then create loans and increase total assets. 
 
Financial Stability Indicators - Following Berger et al. (2009), we use the Z-index, the Non-Performing Loans to 
gross loans (NPL) ratio and Return on Assets (ROA) to measure financial stability. The Z-index is an inverse proxy 
variable for the probability of the firm failing and is thus used as a direct measure of stability. It was first developed 
by Roy (1952) and then later used in empirical banking studies by Boyd et al. (2009), Berger et al. (2009) and Turk-
Ariss (2010), among others. Higher bank capitalisation, and thus stability, is represented by a higher Z-index, with 
unstable earnings represented by a lower Z-index. Thus, an increase in the Z-index indicates more stability and a 
decrease in the Z-index indicates instability. One index variable is calculated per firm over the sample period. The 
Z-index represents the number of standard deviations below the mean by which the profits of the bank would have 
to fall so as to completely deplete equity capital (Boyd et al., 2009). It is a measure of a bank’s distance to 
insolvency and is formally defined as: 
 
iROA
ii
i
EAROA
Z
__
_________


  
 (2)
 
 
where Zi is the inverse probability of failing (the Z-index), ROAi is the period-average returns on assets for bank i, 
EAi  is the period-average equity to total assets for bank i, and σROAi  is the period-average standard deviation on the 
returns to assets for bank i. The NPL proxy variable is a bank-level ratio of the non-performing loans to total loans. 
The non-performing ratio is averaged over the period of the study, thus resulting in one data point per bank over the 
sample period. 
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Competition Index - Following Berger et al. (2009), we used the Lerner Index to quantify market structure. The 
Lerner index represents the mark-up of price over marginal costs and is an indicator of market power
4
. The 
fundamental policy concern over market power is the association of prices above marginal cost with the reduction in 
output quantity below the perfect competition level. The test to measure the mark-up of the banking products is 
based on the established principle that profit-maximising firms in equilibrium will choose prices or quantities such 
that marginal cost equals their marginal revenue. This price coincides with the demand price under perfect 
competition, but with the industry’s marginal revenue under perfect collusion (Shaffer, 2004). The index is 
calculated on bank-level data and uses the quantity in which the product price exceeds the marginal cost (Berger, 
Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009). The index calculated is averaged over the period of the study for each bank. The 
index can be formally expressed as follows: 
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where LIit is the Leaner Index for bank i at time t, Pit is the ratio of total revenues (interest and non-interest income) 
to total assets for bank i at time t (Proxy for the price of total assets), and MCit is the marginal cost of the total assets 
for bank i at time t. We follow Berger et al. (2009) and Beck et al. (2012) in estimating the marginal cost for each 
firm. The estimation of the Lerner Index requires a quantification of the marginal cost of the total assets for each 
bank. Most empirical studies on banking have used a functional form of marginal cost derived from the 
translogarithmic (translog) total-cost function (see, for example, Shaffer, 1993; Carbó et al., 2009; Berger et al., 
2009). The translog cost function has the advantage of being directly compatible with the theoretically required 
homogeneity conditions, without the use of additional parameters (Shaffer, 2003). Translog equations are derived 
using three input costs; namely, personnel expenses, capital expenses and deposit expenses (Berger et al, 2009). We 
estimate the marginal cost by firstly estimating the translog cost function and then deriving the marginal cost from 
the cost function. We assume a bank is producing a single aggregate output (Qit) using three inputs (labour, funds 
and fixed capital), the prices of which are given by W1it, W2it, W3it, respectively. The input price of labour is 
calculated as total staff expenses divided by total assets. The input price for the funds is the ratio of interest expense 
to total deposits ratio and that of fixed capital is other operating costs divided by total assets. The following 
specification was used to estimate the cost function: 
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 In line with Berger et al. (2009) and Beck et al. (2012), the above equation was estimated separately for 
each country. Marginal costs (MCit) for each firm i was then calculated as follows: 
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3.1 Competition and Stability Regression 
 
 A major restriction when using the Lerner Index is that it does not account for possible endogeneity that 
may arise between market structure and stability. The Efficient Structure Hypothesis postulates that efficiency and 
stability may be driving market structure (Turk-Ariss, 2010). In order to account for the possible endogeneity, the 
model implements the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation using instrumental variables introduced 
by Hansen (1982). The GMM estimator is more efficient than the two-stage least square estimator because it allows 
for heteroskedasticity (Hall, 2005). In order to control for bank-specific heterogeneity, we include two variables that 
                                                          
4 It should be noted that the manner in which the Lerner Index is constructed, does not capture any form of risk premia in the 
price of banks’ products and services. Thus this does break down the positive association between risk premia and the size of 
monopoly rents (Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss 2009). 
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measure bank size and asset composition. Bank size is measured using the log of total assets and asset composition 
is measured using share of total loans to total assets. To control for country-specific heterogeneity, an index of legal 
business rights, as well as business regulation, are included as control variables. The log value of GDP per capita 
and the percentage of foreign ownership are the final control variables used to control for variations in economic 
development. Thus, the final model that we tested can be formally expressed as follows: 
 
tkkkikikikikik FOGDPLRTAFATLTAMPS   87654310 )ln()ln(   (6) 
 
where Sik is the stability index (either the Z-index, ROA, non-performing loans) for firm i in country k, LTAik is the 
ratio of loans to total assets for firm i in country k (proxy variable for bank-asset composition), FATik  is the bank 
heterogeneity control variable – the ratio of fixed assets to total assets for firm i in country k, ln(TA)ik  is the log of 
total assets of bank i in country k (proxy variable for bank size), LRk is the legal business-rights index for country k, 
ln(GDP)k is the country heterogeneity control variable – the log of real Gross Domestic Product per capita, and FOk 
is the percentage of foreign ownership of banks in country k. 
 
3.2 Data 
 
 The data for the study were collected from several sources. The information on bank financial and income 
statements was obtained from BankScope. Bankscope is a comprehensive database collected by Fitch containing 
information on banks from across the globe. Information on macroeconomic indicators, like GDP, was obtained 
from the World Development Indicators online database. Table 1 shows the variables used in the study, the 
definition of the variables, and their sources. The study involves the collection of three competition indices, as well 
as three stability indices, while including bank-level control variables and country-level control variables to account 
for systematic variation over ten African countries for the period of 2005–2010. The empirical methodology that 
was implemented in this study follows closely that used by Berger et al. (2009).  
 
Table 1:  Variable Definition and Data Sources 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variables   
Z-Index 
Bank level stability indicator. Inverse measure of financial health of a bank, the higher 
the Z-Index, the better the bank’s financial health.  Source: Fitch IBCA's Bankscope 
Database, known as Bankscope in short. 
NPL 
Ratio of non-performing loans to the gross number of loans. The greater the ratio a 
bank has, the riskier the loan portfolio of the bank. Source: Bankscope 
ROA 
Return on assets, this dependent variable measures banks profitability. Source: 
Bankscope 
Independent variables   
Lerner Index 
A competition indicator that uses pricing above the product cost to determine the 
competitive environment in which the bank operates. Higher Lerner Indices indicate 
more market power and less competition. Source: Bankscope 
HHI Assets 
A competition proxy variable that calculates the square of the bank assets to total 
market assets to determine the market power of each bank in the banking sector. 
Source: Bankscope 
HHI Deposits 
A competition proxy variable that calculates the square of the bank deposits to total 
market deposits to determine the market power of each bank in the banking sector. 
Source: Bankscope 
Control Variables   
LTA Ratio of gross loans to total assets, calculated at the firm level. Source: Bankscope 
FAT Ratio of fixed assets to total assets, calculated at the firm level. Source: Bankscope 
lnTA The natural logarithm of total assets, calculated at the firm level. Source: Bankscope 
lnGDP 
The natural logarithm of the country’s GDP per capita. Calculated at a country level. 
Source: Bankscope 
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FOk Percentage of foreign-owned banks. Source: Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001)
5. 
LR 
The legal-rights index ranges between 0 and 10, where 10 indicate strong legal rights 
and 0 indicate weak legal rights. Source: World Bank6 
Instrumental Variables   
Activity Restrictions 
Activity restrictions index ranges from 4 to 16 with 4 indicating the banks have little-
to-no restrictions and 16 indicating the banking sector is heavily restricted. Source: 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001). 
Banking Freedom 
The index measures the extent to which financial service providers can freely operate 
without government intervention. The extent of government intervention in the sector 
could be in the form of: restricting foreign bank ownership, government influence on 
credit allocation, etc. The higher the index, the more restricted is the banking sector. 
Source: Heritage Foundation online database. 
Government ownership bank ownership 
Government ownership is a percentage expressed as a value between 0 and 100. 
Source: Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001). 
 
 The study was restricted to testing all commercial banks within the sample countries. Table 2 shows the 
countries and the number of banks used in the study. 
 
Table 2:  Sample Countries And The Number Of Banks Included In The Study 
Country Number of Commercial Banks 
South Africa 16 
Egypt 23 
Nigeria 19 
Algeria 14 
Morocco 10 
Sudan 14 
Tunisia 14 
Ghana 21 
Kenya 31 
Ivory Coast 8 
Total 170 
Source: BankScope 
 
Stability Indices - The study uses three proxies to quantify banking-sector stability: the Z-index, the NPL ratio and 
ROA. The indices are obtained from each of the bank’s financial statements, which are obtained from the 
BankScope database. The Z-index and the NPL are averaged over the six-year sample period, resulting in one data 
point per firm over the 2005–2010 period.  
 
Competition Indices - The Lerner Index was calculated using the total cost, total revenue, and total-assets data. All 
data required for the construction of the Lerner Index were obtained from the financial statements of each bank and 
from BankScope. The Lerner Index was constructed for each firm per year and then averaged over the period of the 
study to get one index per firm over the sample period. Two additional competition indices are used in the study: the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index using deposits (HHI deposits) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index using total assets 
(HHI assets). The HHI deposits are calculated by summing the total number of deposits in the country and then 
squaring the ratio of bank deposits to industry-wide deposits. The same is done for the assets of the bank in order to 
collect the HHI assets data. The data for the competition indices are summarised in Table 3. Most of the variables 
used are ratios; therefore, they do not need to be converted to US dollars before use.  However, where necessary, the 
data were converted to US dollars. It must be noted that the Bankscope database already converts the data to US 
dollars using appropriate exchange rates. The macroeconomic data were also converted to US dollars using 
appropriate exchange rates. 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 As updated in 2012. 
6 World Banks’s “Doing Business” database 
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Table 3:  Data Sources And Summary Statistics 
Notes: Z stands for the Z-index, NPL stands for non-performing loans, ROA stands for Returns on Assets, Lerner stands for the 
Lerner Index, HHITD stands for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index using deposits,  HHITA stands for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
using total assets, AR stand for Activity Restrictions Index, GO stands for percentage of Government-Owned Bank, BF stands 
for Banking-Freedom Index  
 
3.3 Estimation of the Competition-Stability Relationship 
 
 The purpose of the study is to estimate the relationship between the competition index and the stability 
index. In order to account for variances across countries, the study incorporates control variables suggested by 
Berger et al. (2009). The control variables include the loans to total assets, the fixed assets to total assets, and the 
natural logarithm of total assets. These variables are bank-specific control variables and one data point is taken per 
bank over the six years. The next set of control variables accounts for country-specific effects, such as the legal 
business-rights index, which is collected from the World Bank’s “Doing Business” database. The legal-rights index 
ranges between 0 and 10, where 10 indicates strong legal rights and 0 indicates weak legal rights. The percentage of 
foreign ownership controls any external influence that occurs in a country’s banking sector. The last control 
variable, GDP per capita, is collected from the World Bank’s World Developing Indicators database.  
 
Instrumental Variables - To account for endogeneity of market power and heterogeneity across countries, the 
Generalised Method of Moments using instrumental variables is implemented. The econometric methodology used 
here is taken from Berger et al. (2009) and uses activity restrictions, banking freedom, and percent of government-
owned banks as instrumental variables. The data for the instrumental variables was collected from Heritage 
Foundation and Barth et al (2001). The data from Barth et al. (2001) was updated in 2012. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
 The results of the study are presented in Tables 4–6. We use three indicators as proxies for financial 
stability. These are the Z-index (used as the dependent variable in Table 4), the NPL (used as the dependent variable 
in Table 5) and ROA (used as the dependent variable in Table 6). There are three models in each table. Model 1 runs 
the financial-stability indicator on the Learner Index (measure of market power) and other common control 
variables. Model 2 runs the financial-stability indicator on HHID (HHI Deposits) and other control variables. 
Finally, Model 3 runs the financial-stability indicator on HHITA (HHI Total Assets) and other control variables. An 
increase in each indicator of market power (that is the Lerner Index, HHITA and HHID) implies an increase in 
market power or a decrease in competition. The First-Stage F-test was used to test for the relevance of the 
instrumental variables used. The Hansen’s J-test was used to test for the validity of the instrumental variables. The 
results from the Hansen’s J-test show that the instrumental variables are valid in all regressions and the results from 
the First-Stage F-tests confirm that the instruments are relevant. In terms of methodology, we closely follow Berger 
et al. (2009) and utilise a GMM estimator with robust standard errors. The instruments used were banking-activity 
restrictions, banking freedom and the percent of government-owned banks. The regressions also include an indicator 
for legal rights, the log of GDP per capita and the percentage of foreign ownership to account for cross-country 
heterogeneity. The ratio of total loans to total assets, fixed assets to total assets, and the natural log of bank-total 
assets are used to further control for bank-specific heterogeneity. 
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Data Source 
Z 170 44.10 96.97 -0.60 833.13 Bankscope 
NPL 170 8.96 20.84 0.00 244.28 Bankscope 
ROA 170 1.24 2.43 -12.98 9.35 Bankscope 
Lerner 170 0.40 0.66 -2.03 8.03 Bankscope 
HHITD 170 98.23 289.12 0.00 2637.16 Bankscope 
HHITA 170 101.68 318.49 0.00 3217.32 Bankscope 
GDPpc 170 1333.07 1090.10 324.06 3647.45 World Bank Development Indicators 
AR 170 3.10 1.45 1.00 6.00 Barth, Caprio and Levine 
GO 170 17.80 15.57 0.00 42.70 Barth, Caprio and Levine 
BF 170 9.70 1.42 8.00 12.00 Heritage Foundation 
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Table 4:  The Effect Of Market Power On The Z-Index 
Explanatory Variables 
Model 1 
(Lerner Index) 
Model 2 
(HHI Deposits) 
Model 3 
(HHI Total Assets) 
Degree of Market Power 75.471* -0.048 1.750*** 
 
(38.45) (0.65) (0.165) 
Loans to Total Assets 0.741** 0.341 2.161 
 
(0.35) (0.42) (3.52) 
lnTA (Bank Size) -1.273 2.621 -45.236 
 
(3.80) (3.89) (138.72) 
Fixed Assets to Total Assets 3.511 0.529 0.736*** 
 
(4.21) (2.34) (0.150) 
lnGDP 10.340*** 8.352*** -98.412*** 
 
(2.07) (2.39) (25.35) 
Foreign Ownership 0.625** 0.231 -4.031 
 
(0.232) (0.203) (10.64) 
Legal Rights 4.231 -0.341 -14.221 
     (3.96) (2.81) (35.27) 
Constant -130.281* -21.362 1497.326 
 
(74.876) (54.23) (374.33) 
    Number of banks 168 168 168 
First stage F-Test 3.99 2.46 2.87 
Prob>F 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Hansen's J  1.959 3.628 2.147 
P-value 0.248 0.897 0.861 
Notes: ***, **, * stand for significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10%. Models 1, 2 and 3 regress the Z-index on Lerner Index, 
HHI Deposits and HHI Total Assets (measures of market power) respectively. Included in each model are common control 
variables.  
 
 Table 4 shows the results when using the Z-index as the proxy for financial stability. The Z-index is 
derived from adding ROA and the ratio of equity to total assets and then dividing the result by the standard deviation 
on the returns to a bank’s assets. An increase in the Z-index implies an increase in financial stability. An increase in 
profitability and a reduction in leverage increases the Z-index while an increase in the standard deviation on returns 
to assets reduces the index and indicates an increase in bank instability. Results from Models 1 and 3 in Table 4 
show that there is a positive and significant relationship between market power and financial stability, supporting the 
concentration-stability view. Our results using data on African firms also corroborate findings by Allen and Gale 
(2000; 2004), Besanko and Thakor (2004), and Edwards and Mishkin (1995). The results in Table 4 also show the 
importance of other control variables. For example, we find a positive relationship between real GDP per capita and 
financial stability. This result is consistent and robust across the different definitions of market power. Model 1 also 
shows a positive relationship between foreign ownership and financial stability. Financial stability is also positively 
related to the total loans-total-assets ratio. In Model 3, we also find a positive relationship between the fixed-assets 
ratio to total-assets ratio and financial stability. 
 
 Table 5 shows results for regressions of NPL ratio on degree of market power and other covariates. The 
NPL ratio is calculated as NPL divided by total loans. An increase in the ratio indicates a decrease in financial 
stability and vice versa. Model 1 uses the Lerner Index as a proxy for market power, Model 2 uses HHID, and 
Model 3 uses the HHITA. Results for all models show a negative and statistically significant relationship between 
the NPL ratio and the three measures of market power, suggesting that an increase in market power is stability-
enhancing. This implies that imperfect markets may be good for stability. This finding, which confirms the 
competition-fragility view, harmonises with Keeley (1990), Allen and Gale (2000; 2004), Besanko and Thakor 
(2004), and Edwards and Mishkin (1995). 
 
As for the other covariates, we find a consistent and significant negative relationship between NPL ratio 
and GDP per capita in Models 1 and 3. Mixed results are found for the relationship between NPL ratio and bank 
size. A positive relationship is found in Models 2 and 3 and a negative relationship is obtained in Model 1. The 
positive outcome could be due to bigger banks investing in large-scale operations, which could cause increased risk 
through lack of sufficient diversification. The negative relationship between bank size and NPL ratio could be the 
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result of more successful portfolio selection in larger banks than in smaller ones. This could be explained by larger 
banks having larger budgets to employ more skilled workers, or other more sophisticated screening techniques 
(Berger et al., 2009). The GDP per capita coefficients of -2.45 and -3.49 (in Models 1 and 3) confirm our 
expectation that a country with a high GDP per capita tends to have a more mature banking sector, which will have a 
more evolved portfolio-selection process. Thus high-income countries tend to have more stable banking systems. 
The loans-to-total-assets ratio is positively related to the NPL ratio in Model 1, implying that banks that loan out 
more money relative to their assets tend to have riskier loan portfolios. Mixed results are also found on the 
relationship between foreign bank ownership and financial stability.  
 
Table 5:  The Effect Of Market Power On NPL 
Notes: ***, **, * stand for significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10%. Models 1, 2 and 3 regress NPL on Lerner Index, HHI 
Deposits and HHI Total Assets (measures of market power) respectively. Included in each model are common control variables.  
 
Table 6:  The Effect Of Market Power On ROA 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Model 1 
Lerner Index 
Model 2 
HHI Deposits 
Model 3 
HHI Total Assets 
    Degree of Market Power 0.538*** 0.783*** 0.580* 
 
(0.152) (0.198) (0.31) 
Loans to Total Assets -0.015 0.005 -0.021 
 
(0.01) (0.54) (0.78) 
lnTA (Bank Size) -0.097 -0.591 -0.311 
 
(0.11) (0.93) (0.27) 
Fixed Assets to Total Assets -0.189 -0.202 -0.350* 
 
(0.131) (0.16) (0.19) 
lnGDP 0.151 0.026 0.033 
 
(0.45) (0.45) (0.38) 
Foreign Ownership 0.012 0.759*** 0.284 
 
(0.02) (0.18) (0.34) 
Legal Rights 0.186* 0.195*** 0.188*** 
 
(0.09) (0.04) (0.02) 
Constant 6.457*** 7.399*** 5.164*** 
 
(2.13) (2.15) (1.53) 
    
Dependent Variable: NPL 
Model 1 
(Lerner Index) 
Model 2 
(HHI Deposits) 
Model 3 
(HHI Total Assets) 
Degree of Market Power -18.514* -0.065*** -0.068*** 
 
(9.54) (0.017) (0.016) 
Loans to Total Assets 0.139*** 0.024 0.021 
 
(0.04) (0.084) (0.88) 
lnTA (Bank Size) -1.160* 2.851*** 3.914*** 
 
(0.59) (0.79) (0.856) 
Fixed Assets to Total Assets 0.355 0.142 0.131 
 
(0.55) (0.57) (0.42) 
lnGDP -2.450* -1.821 -3.492* 
 
(1.25) (1.35) (1.99) 
Foreign Ownership -0.085 0.354*** -6.580*** 
 
(0.25) (0.02) (1.14) 
Legal Rights -0.485 -0.685 -0.799 
 
(0.45) (0.74) (0.75) 
Constant 24.45* 15.498*** 17.576*** 
 
(12.32) (3.10) (2.69) 
Number of Banks 168 168 168 
    First stage F-Test 5.96 10.33 10.7;9 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen's J  0.850 0.021 0.035 
P-value 0.532 0.120 0.850 
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Number of Banks 168 168 168 
First stage F-Test 1.25 1.64 1.98 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen's J  0.014 0.87 1.37 
P-value 0.895 0.514 0.381 
Notes: ***, **, * stand for significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10%. Models 1, 2 and 3 regress the Return on Assets (ROA) on 
Lerner Index, HHI Deposits and HHI Total Assets (measures of market power) respectively. Included in each model are common 
control variables.  
 
 Table 6 presents results when using the return on assets (ROA) as the dependent variable and the Lerner 
Index, HHID and HHITA as the respective market power proxies in Models 1, 2 and 3. An increase in ROA implies 
an increase in bank profitability and possibly financial stability. In all the three models, we find a positive 
relationship between ROA and the different measures of market power. This implies that there is a positive 
relationship between financial stability and market power, again confirming the competition-fragility hypothesis. 
This positive outcome extends to the relationship between legal rights and ROA, implying that an improvement in 
legal rights enhances profitability and financial stability. Model 2 also shows a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between foreign bank ownership and financial stability. The positive relationship between legal rights 
and stability indicators was also robust, suggesting that African governments should come up with policies aimed at 
improving property-rights systems. This is important, especially given the current debate in a number of countries 
concerning the ownership of resources like mines and land. African governments need to come up with coherent and 
clear policies on ownership and property rights assignment. On the contrary, a negative relationship exists between 
the fixed assets/total assets ratio and financial stability in Model 3. This implies that more illiquid banks will not 
earn as highly as a liquid bank would. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Banking literature is divided into the theory that states that competition is good for financial stability and 
the theory that argues that bank competition is bad for financial stability. This study attempted to investigate the 
relationship between banking-sector competition and stability; that is, is competition in the banking sector good or 
bad? This is an important question in both developed and developing economies, especially given the devastating 
effects of the current global financial crisis. Using data from ten African countries over the period 2005–2010, this 
study investigated the relationship between bank competition and financial stability. It used three stability indices 
and three competition indices to further understand the relationship. The empirical results suggest that all the market 
power proxies are positively related to ROA and the Z-index, implying that an increase in market power increases 
financial stability. This suggests that there is a trade-off between competition and financial stability, supporting the 
so-called competition-fragility hypothesis. The market-power proxies are also negatively related to the NPL ratio, 
again confirming the competition-fragility hypothesis. Our findings corroborate those by Keeley (1990), Allen and 
Gale (2000; 2004), Besanko and Thakor (2004), and Edwards and Mishkin (1995). 
 
 When it comes to the relationship between market power and other variables, we find a number of 
interesting results. For example, improving legal rights was found to enhance financial-sector stability, suggesting 
that African governments should come up with policies aimed at improving property-rights systems. This is 
especially important given the current debate in a number of countries concerning the ownership of resources like 
mines and land. African governments need to come up with coherent and clear policies on ownership and property-
rights assignment. The positive relationship between GDP per capita and financial-sector stability suggests that 
high-income countries tend to have more stable banking sectors. The results also suggest that foreign ownership of 
banks tends to be stability-enhancing. If one assumes that the foreign owners of local banks are from developed 
economies where corporate governance systems are well developed, one can conclude that an improvement in 
corporate governance systems can enhance African banking-sector stability. Finally, our results suggest that the 
alliance between African banks through mergers and acquisitions may not necessarily destabilise the financial 
sectors in Africa; instead, this may actually act as a catalyst in facilitating access to finance for enterprises and 
households, ultimately spurring the much needed economic growth and reducing unemployment and rampant 
poverty.  
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